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The paper is focused on an analysis of British-Canadian constitutional and institutional 
relations in connexion with the nation-building process, Mackenzie King’s nationalist 
tendencies and Canadian efforts to be partly recognised as an independent state during 
the Imperial Conference of 1926, which marked a new phase in relations among the 
Dominions and the mother country. The circumstances strengthened Canada’s Prime 
Minister, Mackenzie King, in his conviction that they had to break free from their 
obligations arising from common policies, and instead ensure that Ottawa enforce an 
independent, or at least autonomous, form of foreign policy. Subsequent conflicts of 
opinion between Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Canadian 
Governor-General Viscount Byng affected the agenda of inter-Imperial relations 
regarding ensuring a precise definition of the institutional status of Governors-General. 
Mackenzie King thought that Governors-General should from then on represent 
the Crown, but not the London government. This change would give Dominion 
governments direct access to the King. Previously, Governors-General in the Dominions 
had been viewed more as “communication intermediaries” between Britain and local 
representatives rather than direct representatives of the King.
[British-Canadian Relations; British Empire; Imperial Conference; Governors-General; 
William Lyon Mackenzie King; Viscount of Byng]
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Constitutional relations between the mother country and the Dominions 
were one of the most important and most interesting chapters of British 
Imperial history in the 1920s. The establishment of the first Dominions 
through the coming together of previously geographically linked Self-
Governing Colonies opened up the question of what the Dominions’ 
new position was in regard to the mother country and other parts of 
the Empire. Canada, the oldest Dominion, had many old ties binding it 
to Great Britain, in contrast to the other “white” overseas settlements. 
The circumstances and debates around the Chanak Incident (or Chanak 
Crisis), the Conference of Lausanne, the Canadian-American fishing 
treaty (the so-called Halibut Treaty), the 1923 Imperial Conference, the 
Geneva Protocol and the Pact of Locarno were significantly reflected in 
a clearer determination of Dominions’ constitutional position. These 
affairs might appear that Canada’s position was a key factor in the 
subsequent development of relations between the Dominions and Great 
Britain. In fact, this was not the case. As a result of his dispute with the 
Governor-General, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of 
Vimy, Canada’s Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King played 
a  large role in ensuring a precise definition of Governors-General’s 
institutional status at the Imperial Conference of 1926 which meant 
a new phase in the constitutional relations between the Dominions and 
the mother country.
* * *
When Mackenzie King entered politics, he wanted to be a principled and 
moral politician of strong character like his grandfather.2 From December 
1921 when he became Prime Minister, he was heavily reliant on the votes 
of liberal francophone Quebec voters, who gave him a solid parliamentary 
majority.3 In mid-1925, he came to the conclusion that it was essential 
a cabinet reshuffle take place to ensure support, and as such he called 
on the Governor-General to dissolve the House of Commons. Viscount 
Byng of Vimy consented. Mackenzie King thought he would win easily;4 
2 J. E. ESBEREY, Personality and Politics: A New Look at the King-Byng Dispute, in: 
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 6, 1, 1973, p. 41.
3 C. P. STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies: 
1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era, Vol. 2, Toronto 1981, p. 73.
4 H. B. NEATBY, William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924–1932: The Lonely Heights, Vol. 2, 
London 1963, pp. 60–73.
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he relied on the publicity the media surrounded him with.5 The electoral 
results, however, represented a personal loss for the Liberal leader as he 
had failed to defend his mandate in his home constituency of North York.
The Liberal loss shifted the balance of power within Canadian politics. 
The Prime Minister held confidential consultations with the Governor-
General on his next step, who recommended he resign. Initially, Mac-
kenzie King saw no alternative and agreed. Subsequently, however, he 
decided to remain in office for the time being, even though he did not 
have a majority in the House of Commons. During subsequent meetings, 
Viscount Byng allegedly made it clear that he did not see another dis-
solution of parliament and another election as a solution. However, he 
preferred the parliamentary crisis be dealt with quickly, and as such in 
the end he supported the Prime Minister’s proposal that the members 
of parliament elected convene quickly. On the one hand, Canada’s 
Governor-General did not want to extend the “post-electoral agony” 
indefinitely, and on the other hand he made it clear he was ready to act 
if needed.6
On 4 November 1925, Mackenzie King spoke publicly, acknowledging 
that no party had received a majority in parliament. He stated the cabinet 
had made “careful consideration of the constitutional precedents and their bearing 
upon the situation” and all eventualities, and that therefore “[…] the Cabinet 
decided unanimously this afternoon that it was their constitutional duty to meet 
Parliament at the earliest possible moment […]”.7 Until the time it convened, 
Mackenzie King intended to govern the country along with his govern-
ment even without confidence, thus postponing his resignation. In the 
end, in mid-January 1926 Mackenzie King acquired limited support from 
the Progress Party, gaining a parliamentary majority of three seats.8
A controversial government decision over customs tariffs led to conflict 
with Progress Party members of parliament at the end of May 1926. The 
minority government’s difficulties came to a climax on the weekend 
of 26 and 27 June, when Mackenzie King refused to make any conces-
sions, instead asking the Governor-General Viscount Byng to dissolve 
5 M. BOURRIE, The Myth of the “Gagged Clam”: William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Press 
Relations, in: Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition, 3, 2, 2010, pp. 13–30.
6 ESBEREY, p. 47; The National Archives (further only TNA), Dominion Office (further 
only DO), 117/4, [Memorandum by] A. F. Sladen, 18th January, 1926, ff. 1–4 [9–12].
7 TNA, DO 117/24, [Statement Issued by Mackenzie King], 4th December [sic], 1925, 
ff. [9–10].
8 NEATBY, pp. 82, 111.
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the House of Commons and call a new election. He was persuaded the 
Conservative opposition leader Arthur Meighen would be unable to 
set up a government and as such the Governor-General would have to 
accede to his request.9 Byng rejected his request on the basis of similar 
precedents in New South Wales,10 without waiting to hear the stance of 
Britain’s Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Leopold Amery, and on 
28 June Mackenzie King resigned.11 The Governor-General believed that 
if he had acceded, he would have given the Liberals unfair advantage in 
the election campaign, and therefore concluded that Meighen should 
also reciprocally get the chance to set up a government, and Meighen 
gratefully accepted the opportunity.12 On 2 July the newly formed cabinet 
appeared before the parliament to ask for its confidence, which in rather 
dramatic circumstances it did not receive. As such, Arthur Meighen was 
forced to ask the Governor-General that the parliament be dissolved, and 
the Governor-General acceded.13
From the start, Mackenzie King had considered Byng a confidential 
advisor, close friend and political partner who held the same status as 
he did hierarchically; in no way did he consider him senior.14 Since the 
Canadian constitution did not have a clear interpretation in this matter, 
Mackenzie King criticised the fact that Byng had not asked for precise 
instructions from London. Amery did not make any statement, because 
9 ESBEREY, p. 49.
10 TNA, Colonial Office (further only CO) 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor 
General to the Secretary of State, 30th June, 1926, Doc. No. 146, f. 145 [491]; TNA, 
CO 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor General to the Secretary of State, 
30th June, 1926, Doc. No. 147, f. 146 [492].
11 University of Cambridge: Churchill College: Churchill Archives Centre (further only 
CAC), Amery Papers (further only AP), AMEL 2/4/4, Larkin to L. S. Amery, 29th June, 
1926, [s. p.].
12 Cf. R. GRAHAM (Ed.), The King-Byng Affair, 1926: A Question of Responsible Government, 
Toronto 1967, pp. 23–24; TNA, Cabinet Papers (further only CAB) 24/180/82, 
Mackenzie King to Byng, 3rd July, 1926, f. [79]; TNA, DO 117/24, Mackenzie King to 
L. S. Amery, 17th July, 1926, ff. [6–8]; TNA, CAB 24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), Paraphrase 
Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the Governor General 
of Canada, 1st July, 1926, f. 7; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor 
General to the Secretary of State, 30th June, 1926, Doc. No. 145, ff. 144–145 [491]; 
TNA, DO 117/20, Note, [July 1926], f. [5]; TNA, CAB 24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), 
Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the Governor 
General of Canada, 1st July, 1926, f. 7.
13 STACEY, p. 76.
14 ESBEREY, pp. 44, 48; TNA, DO 117/20, The Times, 1st July, 1926, f. [37].
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he thought, “[…] that in my view it would not be proper for the Secretary of 
State to issue instructions with regard to the exercise of his constitutional duties to 
a Governor”.15 Byng’s position on dissolving the House of Commons at 
once confirmed to the Liberals that the Governor-General favoured the 
Conservatives, and as such they ran the election campaign as a battle for 
Canadian autonomy.16 On 14 September 1926, the Liberal Party won 
and Mackenzie King was happy to consider this proof that his request for 
dissolution of parliament had been justified. In contrast, Viscount Byng 
perceived it as a personal disappointment.17
Byng’s decision really did seem to be mistaken rather than constructive 
and was more attune to the acts of Colonial Governors during the Vic-
torian era than during the 1920s. He had thought the Governor-General 
had the absolute right to dissolve parliament or choose not to.18 Britain’s 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Amery had been critical for some 
time of Canada’s Governor-General. Viscount Byng sent less reports to 
London, for example, than other Governors-General,19 and as such Amery 
had to prompt him to send him more detailed information from time to 
time on the situation in Canada which were, “a matter of general Imperial 
interest”.20 In contrast, former Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Laird 
Borden said that during the autumn 1925 and summer 1926 crises Byng 
had kept a cool head and despite the complexity of both situations was 
shown to have acted, “not only by perfect constitutional propriety, but by rare 
good judgment”.21
As a result of the parliamentary crisis, Canada’s Prime Minister officially 
opened the issue of the royal prerogative and the status of the Governor-
General. He perceived the dispute with Viscount Byng as clear evidence of 
15 TNA, DO 117/20, Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the 
Governor General of Canada, 1st July, 1926, f. [30].
16 STACEY, pp. 76–77.
17 CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/4, Byng to L. S. Amery, 18th September, 1926, ff. [1]–3.
18 Cf. CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/4, Byng to L. S. Amery, 17th July, 1926, ff. [1]–2; TNA, CAB 
24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), Paraphrase Telegram from the Governor General of Canada 
to the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs, 30th June, 1926, f. 2; TNA, DO 121/60, 
Canada: Private Letters Addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, June – 
July 1926, ff. 1–15.
19 TNA, DO 117/4, C. P. D. to L. S. Amery, 2nd January, 1926, f. [4].
20 TNA, DO 117/4, L. S. Amery to Byng, 12th February, 1926, ff. [13–14].
21 CAC, AP, AMEL 2/1/11, Borden to Byng, Ottawa, 6th July, 1926, [ff. 1–2]; CAC, AP, 
AMEL 2/1/11, Borden to L. S. Amery, Ottawa, 18th September, 1926, [ff. 1–4]; CAC, 
AP, AMEL 2/1/11, L. S. Amery to Borden, 4th October, 1926, [s. f.].
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the subordination and unequal status of the Dominions considering that 
in Britain no request for dissolution of parliament had been rejected for 
centuries.22 Mackenzie King held a different opinion and interpretation 
of the Governor-General’s status as an institutional tool of Crown power. 
For this reason, it was decided to ask the participants of the planned Impe-
rial Conference to state their opinion on Governors-General’s position in 
Dominions and the request to dissolve the lower parliament in June 1926. 
The nub of the problem was in the ambiguous “technical status” of the 
Governor-General during government crises. It was shown that in these 
situations, a rigidly determined procedure would be better than an ap-
proach based on “trust” in the Governor-General’s ambiguously defined 
constitutional role. As such, during 1926 the Canadian Prime Minister 
clearly supported the demand for the equal status of Dominions.23
On 19 October 1926, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin officially 
opened the Imperial Conference with a speech which on the one hand 
summarised the successes of the previous meeting between British and 
overseas representatives, and on the other hand outlined the future 
direction of the Empire.24 Thus the need had arisen to clarify the current 
ambiguous legal and constitutional status of the Dominions. Although 
the institutional reorganisation of Britain’s Colonial Office and the 
establishment of the Dominion Office in 1925 had brought the principle 
of equality into relations between the Dominions and the mother country, 
in the summer of 1926 these changes seemed to be more “cosmetic” 
administrative measures with little impact on the constitutional situation 
within the Empire. As such, Britain anticipated that the Prime Ministers of 
the Union of South Africa, Canada, and the Irish Free State would demand 
constitutional reforms at the Conference.25
22 TNA, DO 117/20, The Times, 2nd July, 1926, ff. [40–41].
23 N. MANSERGH, The Commonwealth Experience: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth, 
Vol. 2, London 1982, pp. 22–23; J. A. STEVENSON, The Byng-King Controversy, in: New 
Statesman, 28, 724, 12th March, 1927, pp. 659–660.
24 Cmd. 2769, Imperial Conference, 1926: Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings, London 
1927, pp. 5–14; I. M. CUMPSTON (Ed.), The Growth of the British Commonwealth 
1880–1932, London 1973, p. 57; TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), Imperial Conference, 
1926: Stenographic Notes of the First Meeting, Downing Street, 19th October, 1926, 
ff. [2–6].
25 P. C. OLIVER, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory 
in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, Oxford 2005, pp. 45–47; United Kingdom, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 5th Series, Vol. 65, 27th July, 1926, cc. 285–287; 
TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7185/26, Irish Free State: Extract from Dail Eireann Debates, 
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The prime ministers agreed that issues related to relations within the 
Empire, would be the responsibility of a committee comprised of Prime 
Ministers and other important Dominion and British delegates. This 
committee would have the task of investigating all contentious issues 
and aspects of relations within the Empire, and subsequently present an 
extensive report to the Conference which would become an underlying 
instrument for the further development of the British Empire. The former 
British Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour, 1st Earl of Balfour, was ap-
pointed chair of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations.26
There remain today several stories told about the adoption of the 
Balfour Declaration of 1926. For example, while Balfour was listening to 
the discussions of his Dominion colleagues, it is alleged he spontaneously 
wrote down the main phrases on the back of an envelope, and these 
then became known as the definition of the position of the Empire’s 
autonomous parts.27 There is another legend based on a claim by Balfour’s 
niece Blanche, that the “famous text” which later included the final 
report was written on a piece of paper torn out of a notebook during 
a meeting. The truth is somewhat different from the myth of the Balfour 
Declaration’s adoption. Most of the text was written during official and 
unofficial discussions and during informal meetings over the course of the 
Conference’s large additional programme. The Declaration’s final form 
represents a compromise between the proposals discussed at the meetings 
of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations, or which had already been 
suggested during confidential discussions between Dominion Prime 
Ministers and British representatives.28
2nd June, 1926, Doc. No. 132, ff. 105–106 [471–472]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7185/26, 
Irish Free State: Extract from Dail Eireann Debates, 3rd June, 1926, Doc. No. 133, 
ff. 106–107 [472]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7213/26, Canada: Extract from Canadian 
Debates, 21st June, 1926, Doc. No. 134, ff. 107–109 [472–473].
26 The British Library, Balfour Papers, Add MS 49704, Hankey to Balfour, 12th October, 
1926, f. [110]; Cmd. 2768, Imperial Conference, 1926: Summary of Proceedings, London 
1926, p. 12; P. MARSHALL, The Balfour Formula and the Evolution of the Commonwealth, in: 
The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 90, 361, 2001, 
p. 543; TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), Imperial Conference, 1926: Stenographic Notes 
of the Eight Meeting, Downing Street, 25th October, 1926, ff. [84–85].
27 N. MANSERGH, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy 
1931–1939, London 1952, p. 11.
28 Cf. R. J. Q. ADAMS, Balfour: The Last Grandee, London 2008, p. 372; CAC, AP, AMEL 
5/39, Birmingham Post: Dominions Prime Ministers at Rugby Wireless Station, 8th No-
vember, 1926, f. [1]; CAC, Hankey Papers (further only HNKY) 24/5, M. Hankey, 
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On 27 October 1926, the Committee had its first meeting, which 
was opened by Chairman Lord Balfour, with a statement containing the 
ideas and phrases which Balfour subsequently used as a basis for several 
passages in his Declaration. In response to this, Canadian Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King recommended also focusing on the status of Governors-
General.29
In mid-November 1926, the Committee for Inter-Imperial Relations 
submitted its final report. Right it the beginning, this states, that, “our 
discussions on these questions have been long and intricate”, but that neverthe-
less they had found, “ […] fundamental principles affecting the relations 
of the various parts of the British Empire inter se” and their relations to external 
countries.30 The Balfour Declaration defined the status of the autonomous 
overseas territories and relations between the Dominions and the mother 
country as follows: “They are autonomous Communities within the British 
empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, 
and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” The 
equal status of Great Britain and the Dominions was highlighted by the 
fact that the mother country was one of seven “self-governing communi-
ties” which were part of the Empire.31 The importance of the Balfour 
Declaration was often compared to the importance of the Magna Carta 
or the Declaration of Rights.32
The system of communication and method of consultation between the 
Dominions and the mother country and the position of the Governors-
General was another important issue alongside defining the position of 
the autonomous overseas territories which was discussed at the Imperial 
Conference. As early as in 1921, General Smuts and Amery had consid-
ered it essential to further clarify the institutional role of Governors, or 
Governors-General in the Dominions; the new demand was made in par-
Inter-Imperial Relations: The Balfour Formula, 1926, [October 1951], f. 7; B. E. C. 
DUGDALE, Arthur James Balfour: 1906–1930, Vol. 2, London 1939, pp. 379–380.
29 TNA, CAB 32/56, E. (I. R.–26), Imperial Conference, 1926: Committee of Inter-
Imperial Relations: Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee, 27th October, 
1926, ff. 2–11 [8–13].
30 TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations 
Committee: Report, 18th November, 1926, ff. 1–2 [2].
31 TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), Imperial Conference, 1926: Committee of Inter-Imperial 
Relations: Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee, 27th October, 1926, f. 2 [8].
32 L. S. AMERY, The Forward View, London 1935, p. 179.
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ticular by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King. He was persuaded 
that Governors-General should from now on represent the Crown, but 
not the London government. This change would give Dominion govern-
ments direct access to the King. Previously, Governors-General in the 
Dominions had been viewed more as “communication intermediators” 
between Britain and local representatives rather than direct representa-
tives of the King. The Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations therefore 
thoroughly discussed the role of Governors-General, their position in 
official communication and other matters.33
The final report included two articles focused on communication and 
the method of consultation within the Empire, entitled System of Com-
munication and Consultation, and Position of Governors-General. Com-
mittee members came to the conclusion that, “[…] the Governor-General is 
no longer the representative of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain; there is 
no one therefore in the Dominion capitals in a position to represent with authority 
the views of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain”.34 This was a wider 
consensual concept which Dominion statesmen agreed to.35
According to the report, this state was, “[…] an essential consequence of 
the equality of status existing among the members of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations that the Governor-General of a Dominion is the representative of the 
Crown, […] and that he is not representative or agent of His Majesty’s Government 
in Great Britain or of any Department of that Government”. As such, Committee 
members were of the opinion that although Governors-General had pre-
viously formally represented a mediator between London and Dominion 
33 Cf. H. D. HALL, Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations, London 
1971, pp. 575–576; J. D. B. MILLER, Britain and the Old Dominions, London 1966, 
pp. 105–107; W. H. TROOP, The Political and Constitutional Implications of the 1926 Imperial 
Conference, MA Thesis, McGill University, Montreal 1929, pp. 35–43.
34 TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations 
Committee: Report, 18th November, 1926, f. 10.
35 R. L. BORDEN, Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation, Oxford 1929, 
pp. 125–126; R. BORDEN, The Imperial Conference, in: Journal of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 6, 4, 1927, pp. 204–205; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/2, Bruce to L. S. 
Amery, 11th November, 1926, ff. [1]–4; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/2, Bruce to L. S. Amery, 
23rd November, 1926, ff. [1]–4; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/7, Athlone to L. S. Amery, Pretoria, 
9th November, 1926, ff. 3–4; R. M. DAWSON, The Government of Canada, 5th Ed., 
Toronto 1970, pp. 144–145; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 53845, New Zealand: House of 
Representatives: Dominions’ Status in Foreign Policy of Empire, 1st September, 1925, 
Doc. No. 128, f. 92 [465]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 430/27, Extracts from a Speech Made 
by the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, 13th December, 1926, Doc. No. 140, 
ff. 113–117 [475–477].
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statesmen, this did not correspond to their constitutional position, 
and as such in future direct communication should take place between 
British and Dominion representatives.36 In practice, Governors-General 
continued to represent the Crown where the sovereign was not present 
in the country in person, and corresponded directly with him.
The compact system of communication and method of consultation 
via High Commissioners represented a new challenge in the period in 
between Imperial Conferences not just for the Dominions, but also the 
mother country. The 1926 idea of the system of High Commissioners 
was based on every Dominion having one British High Commissioner in 
its capital city, who would fulfil a quasi-diplomatic role, and consult on 
current issues at a bilateral level.37 The system of communication through 
High Commissioners who represented their government and not the King 
began to develop fully from the end of the 1920s, and it was expected 




The 1926 Imperial Conference “resolved” the definition of Dominion 
status, and various longstanding anomalies and inequalities from the 
period when Dominions were perceived as subordinate territories. In 
some regards, the Balfour Declaration rectified these aspects of institu-
tional and constitutional relations within the Empire, even though in 
fact it merely formally acknowledged current practice. In place of the 
original idea of a general declaration of Dominion constitutional rights 
and equalities, a series of partial definitions were adopted in response 
to the diverse demands of the Dominion governments. It might appear 
superficially that the whole process of Dominion autonomy was highly 
revolutionary in nature, but this was not the case because a constructive 
“spirit” dominated in discussions. Nevertheless, the Conference both 
covertly and overtly marked the beginning of a long road to extensive 
36 TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations 
Committee: Report, 18th November, 1926, f. 3.
37 M. BELOFF, Imperial Sunset: Dream of Commonwealth, Vol. 2, London 1989, p. 95; HALL, 
pp. 589–590, 596–597; H. G. SKILLING, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency 
to Embassy, Toronto 1945, pp. 115–116.
38 N. HILLMER, A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927–1928, in: The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1, 3, 1973, pp. 339–356.
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revisions and evaluations of the forms, measures, and procedures within 
the Commonwealth. However, the Balfour Declaration did not come into 
force immediately. It took another five years for the legislative process, 
agreed at the 1930 Imperial Conference, to conclude in the form of the 
Statute of Westminster.39
39 R. M. HYAM, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1968, London 
2006, p. 70; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 12913/26/S, Mr. E. J. Harding (Dominions 
 Office) to Sir Maurice Hankey (Cabinet Office), 4th December, 1926, Doc. No. 151, 
ff. 148–149 [492].

